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ABSTRACT
This paper explores several points regarding the development of the
field of artificial intelligence and its potential impact on library science.
The discussion is motivated by the nature of future library collections
and services that will be made available (in part) through artificial
intelligence applications and by the basic need for intelligent analysis
of the vast volumes of data and information that will be available through
continuing developments in storage and communication technology.
The general concept of intelligence is shown to involve a number of
more specific types of thinking, and dimensions and objects of thought,
and several examples of current research areas concerned with these
more specific problems are described. A general fieldwide dialectic
between research oriented towards these specific problems and research
oriented towards the integration of these specific capabilities into
broader systems is described and related to the general question of
improving the capabilities of interactive intelligent systems. These issues
are discussed in the context of several definitions of intelligence and
artificial intelligence and are illustrated in the example of a specific
system.
INTRODUCTION
This conference began twenty-six years ago to explore applications
of computer technology, often called "data processing" at the time,
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to libraries. This year, the conference will explore the potential impact
on libraries of what is in many respects the most advanced aspect of
computational technology, that of artificial intelligence and the
particular subarea within it known as expert systems. Where do we
stand in the field of artificial intelligence? In the last several years,
there has been a dramatic increase in the level of activity related to
library applications of artificial intelligence, much of it conducted by
the participants at this conference. And yet, even given these efforts,
it is useful to begin this process by asking what the general prospects
are for artificial intelligence applications in the domain of library
science. One reason for this concern is simply the fact that libraries
constitute, because of the size and variety of materials that they contain,
an extremely difficult problem for any technological application. This
is evidenced by the relatively slow pace at which even conventional
technologies and capabilities such as online catalogs and compact disk
readers have moved into widespread use. The deeper library applications
of artificial intelligence will be faced in a much more direct way with
the breadth and depth of the contents of a library, than has been any
other technological facet of librarianship.
This review will begin by suggesting a general scenario of what
the library of the future might look like, and how artificial intelligence
will influence the nature of the collections and services that will be
possible. Next, it will present a characterization of the importance of
intelligent analysis for any efficient utilization of the information
resources of the future. The basic point is that intelligent analysis is
inevitable if we are to cope with the information explosion provided
by the communication and storage media of the future. To put it another
way, even the tremendous storage and transmission facilities that will
be available will be inadequate for what might seem to be fairly
straightforward applications if they are not handled in ways that are
based on intelligent analysis.
Assuming that intelligent analysis is necessary, we will next turn
to ask the question, "What will it take to accomplish this?" There are,
of course, many aspects to the answer to that question; fortunately,
two of the most important general aspects of this question, the areas
of knowledge representation and natural language processing, will be
reviewed separately later in this conference, and so will not need detailing
here. The emphasis will be on the question of what kinds of thinking
processes do people seem to employ, and how successfully can we deal
with these processes in artificial intelligence? This discussion is
organized around the following definitions of intelligence and artificial
intelligence, each of which contributes to a general sense of what the
field of artificial intelligence is about, including what the difficulties
are and why it proceeds in the manner in which it does:
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1. Intelligence is data, information, and knowledge compression
2. Intelligence is a shared body of knowledge
3. Intelligence is appropriate action
4. Intelligence is entailment
5. Intelligence is common sense reasoning
6. Intelligence is culture, communication, and cooperation
7. Intelligence is the ability to learn
In the course of discussing these definitions, particularly the latter
three, several key general research areas that are currently being explored
in artificial intelligence will be introduced, and an attempt will be
made to show how these abstract problems relate to the problem of
developing general artificial intelligence capabilities. In developing the
implications of these definitions of intelligence, several themes regarding
the nature of artificial intelligence and how research is proceeding in
this area will also be explored. These include:
1. The need to simulate human thinking. Although some people in
artificial intelligence question the need to simulate human thinking,
(i.e., "airplanes don't flap their wings"), there is a growing realization
that some aspects of human thinking are critical for any successful
intelligent system. For instance, it seems necessary in scientific or
engineering problem solving to approach problems first in a
qualitative "common sense" manner prior to bringing full
quantitative rigor to bear, if for no other reason than computational
efficiency. Furthermore, for systems to engage in scientific discovery
in these sorts of domains, they need to incorporate ideas relating
to the
"interestingness" of concepts, and this also takes us outside
the realm of the narrowly defined science itself and seems to introduce
elements of human cognition. In any case, for those of us concerned
with library applications of artificial intelligence, there is little choice
but to embrace the cognitively oriented approach to artificial
intelligence, since the majority of applications we are interested in
will involve analyzing and utilizing the vast store of the products
of human thought that is contained in libraries, and mediating
between those products and the thought processes of users. The ability
to deal intelligently with the vast scope of the contents of the libraries
of the world is by far the most difficult challenge that one can pose
for artificial intelligence and natural language processing, although,
of course, as in all application domains, there are many useful smaller
and shorter-term projects that can be undertaken.
2. The dialectics of artificial intelligence. A second theme regarding
the nature of artificial intelligence will concern the manner in which
the overall research program seems to employ a dialectic between
research concerned with analyzing particular issues in great depth
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and research concerned with synthesizing some of the results of such
work in larger systems that cut across a number of issues.
3. Learning: A critical issue but not a panacea. One of the particular
issues in artificial intelligence is that of machine learning. While
the importance of this issue in the general scheme of things in artificial
intelligence should be stressed, one should guard against the
temptation, which has hundreds of years of precedent in Western
thought, to try to avoid a direct assault on all of the other tough
issues regarding the nature of thought by simply attempting to build
a learning machine.
4. Requirements for intelligent interactive systems. Having looked at
a sample of the abstract problems involved in simulating thinking,
this paper will turn to expert systems what is required to build
more useful intelligent systems applications, particularly interactive
systems, and how these requirements relate to the sorts of abstract
problems already discussed. A system under development at the
University of Pittsburgh, whose purpose is to aid in the design and
diagnosis of local area networks, will illustrate these issues.
5. What is artificial intelligence? This paper concludes with some
general considerations of the fundamental nature of artificial
intelligence; briefly considers the question of the need for intelligent
systems to be embedded in the world, and whether that curtails the
promise of really intelligent artificial systems; and then turns to one
final definition of artificial intelligence that seems to avoid these
sorts of problems and nicely summarizes the potential of artificial
intelligence to change not only our libraries but our entire civilization.
THE LIBRARY OF THE FUTURE
The impact of advanced computer technology in general, and
artificial intelligence and expert systems in particular, on the nature
of the library of the future will be immense and qualitatively quite
different even from what we are anticipating now with our current
work. Most of the library-oriented expert systems and artificial
intelligence applications which have been developed to date, or which
are currently under development, are essentially aids to facilitate the
business of running libraries as they are structured today. These
applications and potential applications include systems to aid in
carrying out the support operations of the library, such as collection
development; budget, personnel, and scheduling arrangements; and
disaster planning and response. They also include systems to enhance
user services (or to off-load some of the more routine aspects of user
services) in areas such as ready reference and information retrieval.
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Conventional computer-based approaches are available or possible for
some of these sorts of applications, and artificial intelligence has been
employed in these applications in a variety of ways including projects
which use artificial intelligence as an enhancement for conventional
approaches, and work which uses artificial intelligence programming
techniques just to improve the ease with which conventional programs
(e.g., decision trees) can be implemented. Other projects involve work
which inherently does require artificial intelligence technology for one
or more of the usual reasons (e.g., the combinatorial explosion of possible
alternative situations, the need to deal with uncertainty, the need to
provide transparent flow of control, the need to capture human
heuristics, etc.). Taken together, these sorts of applications are interesting
and important from any of several perspectives, but they will not, in
themselves, change the fundamental nature of the library, except to
make it more useful and more economical to run.
Fundamental changes in the nature of the library will occur as
a result of changes in the nature of the materials that are collected.
Libraries are the major repositories of the knowledge of the world,
but the format in which much of this knowledge is being recorded
has begun to undergo profound changes, and the potential uses that
can be made of this newly formatted knowledge are changing as well.
Artificial intelligence represents a potentially far more profound change
in the format and utilization of knowledge. The challenge to librarians
is to understand the nature of this change, and to conceptualize the
library as the general repository of knowledge, rather than only a
repository for books and other static media. If libraries avoid this
expanded role, new institutions (electronic bulletin board services, the
phone companies, cable TV, CD companies, software manufacturers,
etc.) will step in to fill the need, and will inevitably relegate libraries
to a much less significant position in society than they now occupy.
Electronic Collections of the Future
What will the future library contain and what will it be able to
provide for the user based on these materials? This section will provide
a range of possibilities, ranging from the immediately do-able to the
long-range possibilities. It can be considered a research blueprint for
the library of the future (Cerf, 1989).
Documents
Electronic documents can be printed by anyone who has access
to a printer, and they can be tailored in various ways to the individual
needs of the user. (The legal and financial issues thus raised are outside
the scope of this paper.) As documents become more frequently prepared
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
in digital form, and as advantage begins to be taken of the potential
that this provides, it will be possible to package, with the document,
information regarding how it can best be presented to, and used by,
the user. At the least this will involve information concerning how
the document can be printed on different devices. It will also be possible
to provide active indexing or glossary facilities, perhaps even hypertext-
like progressive deepening, according to the interest and expertise of
the reader. Some of the library-level indexing (e.g., to related books
of interest) could also be provided within a given text, and could
potentially be tailored to the interests of individual users. (Questions
of authorship and control of the presentation of intellectual property
that these capabilities imply are, again, outside the scope of this paper. )
Data
Both conventional databases and large collections of "raw" sensory
data (e.g., seismic wave recordings, or recordings returned by satellites
or space probes) could be made available online. These could be designed
to provide the appropriate "views" for users of various types. This sort
of interpretation would be far more difficult in the case of raw data,
which is hardly ever useful in an uninterpreted state. (In the short term,
of course, this problem of interpretation could be left to the user, but
this would certainly limit the use of the information.)
Programs and Knowledge Bases as Commodities
Like current electronic bulletin boards, the library of the future
will provide users with various sorts of programs and materials to
develop and/or utilize programs. These could include standard
applications as well as expert systems. A particularly interesting set
of such applications, considering the major role in education that
libraries have always taken, would be computer-aided instruction
programs and intelligent tutoring systems. Since expert systems and
many other forms of artificial intelligence provide a high degree of
separation between the domain-specific knowledge (both conceptual,
as in inheritance hierarchies, and procedural, as in production rules)
and the system that utilizes that knowledge, it will also be very useful
to begin providing libraries of such knowledge bases, to provide support
for future system development.
Procedural Access to the Knowledge
The library of the future may be able to provide a far richer access
to, and utilization of, the knowledge contained (often implicitly) in
its collection. The most immediately feasible development along this
line would be content-based information retrieval. This, of course, would
require a far more general and robust brand of artificial intelligence
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and natural language understanding than what we have available now.
The step beyond that would involve not only understanding text well
enough to determine whether it is relevant to a general information
need expressed by a user, but to understand it well enough to actually
extract information that can be used by a program. There are difficulties
here, since even textbooks normally provide only a declarative description
of a domain, rather than a procedural description of how to carry out
the relevant activities in that domain, but there are potential ways out
of this dilemma. For instance, the book might provide declarative
background for an intelligent workbench intended for a knowledgeable
user. Thus, a skilled designer might use the system to check that he
or she is using unfamiliar materials in ways that conform to the limits
of the materials.
The Physical Library of the Future
Electronic media do not of themselves require the current physical
structure of a library; moreover, there is no reason to restrict a user's
access to what is locally available. So one vision of the library of the
future consists of a vast distributed network of data, information, and
knowledge, accessed via intelligent information gathering and
synthesizing agents that traverse the network in service of users' needs
(Cerf, 1989). This scenario, only hinted at by today's research networks,
bulletin boards, and distributed information retrieval facilities, would
offer immense power to individual users but will require major advances
in a number of technologies to implement in a full sense.
In any case, the physical library certainly will not disappear in
the foreseeable future, although it might change in some very dramatic
ways. First, of course, we will still have media such as books, film,
and art and the need to continue the traditional role of libraries. Second,
the new electronic technologies will themselves create several legal and
economic issues that can probably best be dealt with in terms of a setting
such as that of the physical library. For instance, individuals and even
institutions cannot afford to purchase all of the software and hardware
(including special peripheral devices) they might occasionally need. As
various databases, knowledge bases, and intelligent systems become more
openly available, this situation will become more apparent, and it will
become necessary to develop some sort of distribution mechanism that
can make these resources temporarily available to the general public
and at the same time permit manufacturers and developers to maintain
economic viability (note that the concept of the free public library may
require some modification in this process). The library of the future
may develop, in part, to resemble the campus computing center, which
is more and more growing to resemble a lending library of computing
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resources rather than simply an access point to a central computer.
Finally, the library of the future will probably still provide a good deal
of its functionality in physical structures similar to today's simply
because it is a useful and satisfying social institution. On today's
campuses, computing centers and libraries are both the foci of much
useful interaction and mutual learning, and there is no reason to think
that similar facilities would not be as useful and enjoyable for the general
public. In addition, the public is likely to become more willing to invest
public funds in such resources as its investment in personal computing
increases.
Why Will This Happen?
Definition 1
Intelligence is data, information, and knowledge compression
The scenario portrayed in the last section (or something very much
like it) will come about because it will be driven by the necessity to
deal adequately with the expectations and demands created by the
increasing availability of resources such as: CD and other vast personal
storage media, wide area network access, fiber optic connections to local
work points and homes, and powerful personal computers and
workstations. Artificial intelligence is the only way to deal with this
information explosion.
The reason for this is that dealing with the world through "brute
force" data analysis is doomed to failure. A single screen image on
a typical 19-inch high-resolution monitor involves a million pixels,
each of which can take several bits, depending on the color or gray
scales used in its representation. One second of high-definition TV
requires 4MG of data, which is only four times greater than that required
even by the rather poor resolution of standard TV (Lucky, 1989). (This
is why one cannot simply digitize the incoming signal, store it, and
then "mouse" back to earlier points in the transmission for an instant
replay, the way one can in the windowing systems of computers.)
Although these sorts of transmission rates are on the edge of what is
feasible for general fiber optic technology, they will clearly overwhelm
by orders of magnitude any foreseeable attempts to store large amounts
of the transmissions, utilize multiple simultaneous channels, or
otherwise manipulate the data.
The limits of brute force storage of unanalyzed data are nicely
illustrated by the Library of Congress project designed to preserve copies
of the millions of books which are rapidly degenerating. Since much
of the value of these books lies in their original appearance, and not
just their content, accurate reproduction of these objects would take
billions of bits per page. Consequently, the project is using photography
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(microfiche) rather than digital analysis, in spite of the inherent limits
of retrievability and reproductive fidelity that the analog medium implies
(Battin, 1989).
If the raw sensory data made available by the world requires such
an enormous amount of storage, how was it possible for intelligent
life to evolve and function? The answer is clearly that intelligent life
(meaning life capable of responding appropriately to its environment)
does not require the storage of vast quantities of unanalyzed raw sensory
data, but rather requires a selective sensitivity to various important
properties of that data, and the recording of only a small portion even
of those properties to which it is initially sensitive. For instance, our
human representation (memory) of visual experience is more like a
description (i.e., an abstract summary of the most important features
of an experience) than like a photographic record, even though it does
record a good deal of analog information. In a word, we respond to
and store "content," i.e., information, not raw data. Since these
interpretations require less storage (or transmission) capacity than does
the original raw data, intelligence can be viewed as involving a series
of "data compression" operations that summarize and extract from direct
experience those aspects of the world which are most relevant to the
intelligent system itself.
Definition 2
Intelligence is a shared body of knowledge
There is another observation that makes this point. The more that
is known about something, the less information is required to notice,
remember, or convey any particular information in that area. For
instance, it is extremely difficult to remember a sentence in an unknown
language, but it becomes progresssively simpler if: (a) one knows the
language, (b) one knows about the general topic of the sentence, and
(c) one knows about the specific items mentioned in the sentence.
Similarly, but on a smaller scale, when text is communicated digitally,
it is almost never sent directly as bitmaps of the individual letters
(although some computers do this locally in driving a printer). Rather,
a code such as ASCII is used to indicate (using only a few bits) which
letter is intended, and the host systems share knowledge of how to print
that character. If several fonts are available, they can be indicated by
communicating only a few bits whenever the fonts switch, as long as,
once again, the systems share their knowledge of the fonts. The goal
of natural language understanding can be viewed in this context as
the attempt to isolate or extract the various sources of knowledge, both
linguistic, i.e., phonological/graphemic, morphological, syntactic,
semantic and pragmatic, and general world knowledge, which are shared
by the speakers of a language, and which form the background within
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which new linguistic utterances are interpreted. Since these are already
shared, they need not be communicated, and the amount of new
information conveyed by an utterance is actually quite limited. There
is evidence that this is how people communicate. For instance, after
only a few minutes, all people can remember is the gist, not the form,
of the utterances they have heard or read. One goal of designing
intelligent computational systems is to take advantage of this same
principle of shared knowledge, to enable them to economically store
and transmit the gist of messages.
Libraries provide an extremely difficult challenge for this
undertaking since their content is so broad, and the uses to which a
user might want to put the collection are equally broad themselves.
In fact, one could hardly look for a better illustration of the range
of capabilities needed for a full artificial intelligence or natural language
processing system than that of full-text understanding and content-based
retrieval and utilization.
THE COMPLEXITY OF THE WORLD
The previous section argued that efficient use of the vast
computational, communications, and storage facilities that are rapidly
becoming available will require intelligent analysis of the material used
rather than the manipulation of raw data. It also suggested that part
of what is required for a general understanding capability is a
background body of general world knowledge. The need to encode both
this general background knowledge and any specific knowledge such
as that contained in documents or communications with users leads
to the general question of how to represent that knowledge, and even
to the more general questions of what is intelligence and what is
knowledge.
Symbolic Representation and the Knowledge
Representation Hypothesis
Definition 3
Intelligence is the ability to act appropriately
Intelligence can be defined as the ability of an organism or agent
to carry out appropriate actions in its environment, where the definition
of
"appropriate" is very much dependent on the individual organism
or agent and the environmental context in which it is situated. One
very general approach to defining "appropriate" can be based on the
concept of actions that lead to survival. This approach has the advantage
of being objectively definable even for very simple organisms with very
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limited information processing capabilities. The more interesting case
for artificial intelligence, however, can be defined in terms of the
"appropriateness" of the match between certain internal states which
drive the actions of the system in question (i.e., "goals"), and those
aspects of the environment to which the organism or agent is sensitive.
In these complex information processing situations (especially in the
case of human cognition), the organism is not only directly sensitive
to immediately given properties of the raw sensory data (e.g., heat and
cold, chemical gradients in the air, colors, simple shapes, etc.), it is
also, for the most part, sensitive to higher level abstractions and to
the implications that environmental objects have for various sorts of
activities. In short, the environment as well as the goals of the organism
must be interpreted and internally represented in order to provide the
substance of cognition. This idea has been dubbed the Knowledge
Representation Hypothesis (Smith, 1982). It essentially states that any
intelligent system must be composed of elements that: (1) are
meaningfully interpretable (more specifically, propositionally
interpretable) by an outside observer (which is possible if and only if
the elements designate aspects of the world that correspond to how
the outside observer can interpret the world); and (2) can simultaneously
play a causal role in how the system operates. This idea was originally
developed by Newell and Simon in the 1950s. It was at that time the
basis for the first successful artificial intelligence programs ever written,
and it has been the basis for almost all artificial intelligence programs
that have been written since. This idea was developed into the Physical
Symbol System Hypothesis (Newell & Simon, 1976), which suggests that
any intelligent system will of necessity be based on this architecture.
Many properties of human cognition appear to demand the compu-
tational mechanisms provided by the symbolic representation hypothesis
(Metzler, 1990). In brief, symbols provide a way to internally manipulate
relevant aspects of the world. For instance, they permit one to combine
symbolic representations to produce new products, as in building the
(possibly novel) meaning of a sentence from the meanings of the words,
or as in putting together a new plan or design out of the fragments
of previous ideas. Similarly, they provide a way of re-presenting aspects
of internal or external experience at later points in time, which is also
a critical ingredient of higher thinking.
All this seems to lead to a very straightforward program for artificial
intelligence. All we need to do is figure out how to represent (in the
computer) the symbolic representations contained in the mind. Over
the last two decades, a number of representational devices have been
developed that seem to do a good job of this. Frame representations
are a powerful way of representing concepts, for instance, and rule-
based representations seem to capture a good deal of the conditional
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or "if-then" flavor of thinking. This author dubs the similarity
relationship between these representation schemes and the presumed
human cognitive representations that they are attempting to capture
"Second-Order Platonism" (Metzler, 1990). That is, as Plato sought to
explain human semantics by mapping it to an ideal world, we will
explain machine semantics simply by mapping it to human semantics
(without dealing with Plato's original problem). With it, the deep
philosophical questions of machine semantics are avoided by building
representations that are to correspond as closely as possible to the basic
elements of human thought. (It should be noted, however, that this
avoids only the philosophical problems of the "meaning of machine
meaning," and is only a first step towards solving the general software
engineering problems involved in grasping what a program is doing;
it certainly does not avoid the problems of developing clear and precise
notions of the semantics of programming constructs so that we can
tell exactly how a program ought to behave under specifiable conditions.
In his 1990 paper, this author argues, in support of the knowledge
representation hypothesis, that this semantic correspondence is necessary
for any intelligent system not only (as in the physical symbol system
hypothesis) because of the internal requirements of computation, but
also because it is the only coherent way in which a large-scale knowledge
engineering or software engineering project can be undertaken i.e.,
the modules of any large-scale project must be meaningfully
interpretable in the world, and the products that the modules transfer
among themselves must also be interpretable as corresponding to
meaningful aspects of the world. In order to see why the general problem
of artificial intelligence is so hard in spite of this Second Order
Platonism, it is useful to look at intelligence from yet another perspective.
Entailment
Definition 4
Intelligence is the ability to derive entailments
Another way to conceptualize the general problem of intelligent
behavior is in terms of "entailment," the problem of determining what
is implicit in a knowledge base. For instance, even the very general
problem of deciding what to do next at any particular point in time
can be construed as the problem of determining what action, external
or internal, is suggested (i.e., entailed) by a system's general knowledge
base containing all of the agent's general knowledge of the world, its
own goal structures, and its knowledge of the present relevant
circumstances of the world. For instance, a knowledge base containing
something like the following could be taken to imply something like
"establish the goal to Eat (*)" or that the actual action itself should
be taken.
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Goal-"Eat-Something"
Present (Small-fish-0089)
Instance (Small-fish-0089, Fish-type-005)
Edible (Fish-type-005)
If Goal-"Eat-Something"
and Present(x)
and Edible(x)
Then Eat(x)
Entailment comes in a variety of guises. For instance, if one knows
that "John walked to the store," one also knows that "John went to
the store," because the meaning of "go" is more general than that of
"walk" and thus subsumes it. In addition, one can also infer that John
was at the store for some (possibly very short) period of time after this
act, he was not at the store prior to the act, he had some sort of reason
to go to the store, and he was in reasonably good health when he carried
out the action. (Note that the latter rather boring inference becomes
much more problematic and hence interesting if we also know that
John had just had a serious accident and was in the hospital just prior
to this event.) In addition to these sorts of entailments which seem
to be based for the most part on the semantics of how we use language,
there are entailments that have more to do with the nature of the things
in the world per se. For instance, we know that if a gun's trigger is
pulled, and the gun is loaded, it will fire. It is hard to determine exactly
where to make this distinction between lexical/linguistic and general
world knowledge, however.
Formal (and informal) computational procedures exist for deriving
or proving the implications of a knowledge base, and it would seem
at first that all that is necessary to build an intelligent system is to
bring all of the knowledge together and derive the entailments. Providing
mechanisms by which the system's external actions can influence the
world and by which changes in the world (system generated and
otherwise) can be recorded in the system's knowledge base then closes
the loop. On each cycle, the system derives the appropriate action and
observes any changes that have occurred internally and externally, and
then goes back to deciding what to do next.
(Note that such a system follows the Knowledge Representation
Hypothesis, Physical Symbol Hypothesis, and Second Order Platonism
Principle, since all of the internal elements of the system, including
the steps involved in derivations, are in fact interpretable. Some
implementations of logic programming techniques depart slightly from
the Second Order Platonism idea in that the individual steps used in
the proof methods based on refutation may not correspond to how a
person would normally carry out a logical derivation. However, these
individual steps are still interpretable and, more importantly, the
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larger-grained performance of the system can often correspond closely
to human cognition.)
This is, in fact, a viable architecture for some purposes, but it is
not in itself a complete solution to the problem of intelligence. One
problem, of course, is tractability. Trying to deal with the implications
of an entire general world knowledge base is impossible, so any
intelligent system will require some means of focusing on the
information that is relevant at any particular point. This is particularly
important when one considers how many subtle entailments are involved
in any one piece of information. Somehow, we must avoid being mired
in these usually trivial implications and yet have them available when
comprehension depends on them (Charniak, 1982).
Another major problem, not unrelated to the first, is the problem
of representation. The world, as we think of it as human beings, is
a very complex, multidimensional entity. It consists of concrete as well
as abstract entities that persist and change over time, that influence
each other, that have various relations to each other, and that are
organized into various conglomerate structures a recursive descrip-
tion, since conglomerations persisting over time are themselves entities
that can participate in relations with other entities. It is by no means
clear how to develop representational mechanisms capable of handling
all of the subtleties of our human knowledge of the world, let alone
to meet the additional requirement of computational tractability. As
a result, artificial intelligence has implicitly adopted a two-part strategy
to address this complexity. Many projects in artificial intelligence, often
the more theoretically oriented projects, are essentially aimed at
isolating one particular issue in representation or reasoning, on the
implicit assumptions that: (1) only through a thorough understanding
of these separate issues will we understand how they work together,
and (2) the approaches taken to these separate theoretical perspectives
will in fact prove to be more or less coherent with each other. These
sorts of projects attempt to deal with issues such as:
1. how to represent and reason about difficult dimensions of the world
such as time, space, or causality;
2. how to represent and reason with mental representations of useful
aspects of experience such as "cases" (memories of events) or "models"
(representations of objects and systems);
3. how to reason with uncertain or incomplete information, and with
uncertain knowledge;
4. how to develop coherent structured plans from smaller components;
5. how to reason about the actions, beliefs, and goals of other agents;
6. how to generate and comprehend natural language utterances; and
7. how to learn various aspects of these processes.
16 DOUGLAS P. METILER
The other part of this global implicit research strategy consists of projects
which periodically attempt to merge the current state of understanding
on several issues to see how much can be done within the current state
of understanding.
This section and the next two will sketch out several of the issues
upon which research efforts have been focused in artificial intelligence
over the last few years. This overview will not be exhaustive by any
means, and it is too brief to be really representative. It is intended to
provide a sense of how the very general problem of computational
intelligence can be approached from a variety of more particular
perspectives. In a later section, Future Directions, the nature of the
problems encountered in putting some of these issues together in an
integrated approach to a complex problem is considered.
Common Sense Reasoning
Definition 5
Intelligence is common sense reasoning
In sum, then, artificial intelligence would like to address the full
range of activities involved in an agent's ability to pick up information
from the environment, to internally store meaningful generalizations
over that information, and to internally manipulate representations of
the world that are faithful enough to the real world to provide a useful
basis for determining how the organism ought to act. This may at first
sound like a description only of relatively low level aspects of
intelligence, such as physical navigation in an environment. In fact,
it does describe abstract planning and reasoning as well. Several of the
particular approaches taken to this general problem involve attempts
to capture aspects of common sense reasoning. Although some of these
research directions may appear rather esoteric, it is important to realize
that they all reflect important perspectives on the general capacity of
human thought, the products of which constitute the knowledge base
we call a library.
Nonmonotonic Reasoning
The basic reasoning process presented above in the section on
entailment has certain important limitations, deriving essentially from
the fact that such classic reasoning systems cannot deal with uncertainty
in any fashion. All statements in the system are either true or false.
Moreover, since the inference rules are sound, that is, never produce
an expression that is not entailed in the database, there is a sense in
which logical deduction does not really add anything new to a database
but, rather, only makes explicit what was already implicit. Thus, the
only really new information that is available for the system must in
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fact come from the outside. This point is all the more important when
it is realized that not only is it important in fact for many systems
to acquire new information, for instance, as circumstances change; but
it is also important in principle because it is impossible for any set
of expressions to capture the full detail of any components of the real
world. The expressions are rather an approximate description, and we
will often have occasion to want to update or fine tune that description,
even when it concerns static situations.
But there is an important restriction on the nature of the new
information that is permitted in classic inference systems. In classic
(monotonic) logic, any belief (theorem) that is derivable from a given
set of data (axioms) is also derivable from any superset of that data.
That is, knowing something new cannot result in the deletion of
anything previously believed. This is clearly not the case in human
reasoning where we tentatively hold, and of necessity act on, all kinds
of beliefs, some of which turn out to be simply false, and many of
which turn out to have exceptions. Similarly, it would be an impossible
restriction to have any intelligent system require that all of its beliefs
be certain before it takes any actions based on them. In medical diagnosis,
for instance, data are often uncertain or unavailable, and the rules that
draw conclusions from the data are themselves only probabilistic.
Artificial intelligence has taken a number of approaches in regard
to this problem. The major approach has been to use informal methods
such as certainty factors in rule-based systems and cancellation in
inheritance networks. While these methods seem to work well enough
to support many important theoretical and practical developments in
artificial intelligence, there are some important drawbacks. For one,
although many would equate their informality with the notion of
common sense, they are really just syntactic devices, and if common
sense is anything, it is semantic. The point is that a rule (for instance)
that states that a given conclusion is warranted under certain conditions
does not, in itself, tell why the conclusion is likely, and thus does not
support reasoning regarding the validity of that rule (for instance, under
unusual circumstances). Thus, from a theoretical point of view they
leave us with an inadequate account of this very important aspect of
thought. Second, this informality leads to uncertainty regarding a
system's performance. Not only is the system's performance uncertain,
it can be extremely difficult or impossible to even get an estimate of
how likely an incorrect conclusion might be. This sort of problem will
not necessarily be critical in all applications, but it certainly is when
we contemplate handling applications such as nuclear power plant
maintenance, space station life support, and even national defense.
The other major approach to the problems of dealing with uncertain
information is to try to develop formal models of these processes. For
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instance, if a system is to act on uncertain beliefs, it must have a
mechanism for retracting incorrect beliefs and the conclusions that have
been drawn from them. It must also have a mechanism for expressing
the general "default" or "typically true" beliefs that compose the major
part of human general world knowledge, and for generating those
uncertain inferences that such knowledge would allow, while blocking
the inferences that are clearly unwarranted. Truth maintenance systems
(Doyle, 1979) and their descendants are approaches to the former problem
of how to eliminate no longer supported beliefs, while the general area
of nonmonotonic reasoning has developed to deal with the latter
(Ginsberg, 1987).
The general idea behind nonmonotonic reasoning is to capture
ideas such as "in the absence of information to the contrary, a car will
start when one steps on the gas and turns the key." This assumes several
defaults such as that there is gas in the car, the fuel system is working,
the electrical system is working, there is no anti-theft device set, the
car is in the correct gear to allow the starter to be activated, etc. In
a conventional logic, one would have to specify all of these conditions
to the implication. However, in many cases the exception conditions
may not be enumerable, or they may themselves decompose to a non-
enumerable set of conditions, e.g., all the reasons why the electrical
system might not work. Moreover, this sort of background information
is usually not stated in the case of communication, and is very time-
consuming to gather or to reason about, even in the case of single agent
activities. It simply makes no sense (in most situations at least) to worry
about why the car might not start until it actually fails to do so. What
is needed is a way of warranting the default assumption that if one
wants to start a car, one needs to just press on the gas and turn the
key, unless one has reason to believe that that will not work.
In general, there are two criteria to be met by all approaches to
difficult problems in computational reasoning, including nonmono-
tonic reasoning. First, they must accurately reflect at least part of the
underlying intuitions we have regarding the sort of reasoning in
question; second, they must be computationally feasible, at least within
some constraints. Not surprisingly, it has proven very difficult to develop
formal models that meet both of these criteria adequately. Computa-
tional models of nonmonotonic logics are very slow, and so far are
thought to have (in the general case) the very unfortunate property
of being non-semidecidable. That is, not only are they not guaranteed
to produce an answer in finite time when the answer is "no," as are
standard (semidecidable] first-order systems, but they are also not
guaranteed to produce an answer in finite time in the positive case
either. Not only does this mean that such reasoning systems tend to
be very slow, i.e., the worst case complexity analysis tends to be reflected
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in the average case performance; even more important, it means that
the systems cannot be guaranteed not to make mistakes. That is, if
the system is checking the consistency of a conclusion it would like
to draw, it may never return with the reason for which the conclusion
is in fact inconsistent. As a result, the practical applications of
nonmonotonic reasoning are still rather limited. But it is one of the
most active areas of theoretical investigation, and many expect it to
eventually produce important practical results as well as important
theoretical implications for other areas such as knowledge represen-
tation. In fact, in recent proceedings such as those of AAAI and IJCAI,
work in nonmonotonic reasoning is frequently categorized under
knowledge representation. The following classic examples provide a
sense of the approaches and issues that are being explored in this field.
Closed-World Assumption
Conventional databases assume that any fact not contained in the
database is not true. This avoids the necessity of explicitly recording
all of the possible negative information that the system might otherwise
need to record (e.g., all the possible flights that do not exist in a travel
agent's database). When systems are capable of deriving entailments
from their databases, however, this notion of the "closed-world
assumption" is complicated by the fact that the system might implicitly
contain facts, and one can no longer assume these to be false just because
they are not explicitly stored. In other words, one may now assume
to be false only that information which is neither contained in the
database nor derivable from it. Thus, Reiter (1978) attempted to extend
the closed-world hypothesis to the deductive database case using the
idea that a closure could be calculated for a database by including the
negation of any positive ground literal a basic unquantified expression
that does not contain any connectives ("and," "or," implication, etc.)
that is not entailed by the database. Of course, the reason for drawing
these new inferences is to be able to use them for further reasoning
processes. However, the complexity of the problems involved in
nonmonotonic reasoning is nicely illustrated by the simple fact that
this intuitively appealing idea does not necessarily produce a consistent
database closure. For instance, from (P or Q) both \P and iQ, are
added to the closure since neither P nor Q is itself entailed, but all
three, taken together, are not consistent. Fortunately, there are useful
things that can be done with the closed-world assumption in spite of
this, by restricting its application. For instance, it is possible to talk
about the closed-world assumption with respect to a single predicate
or set of predicates. In addition, the Horn clause formalism, upon which
logic programming languages such as PROLOG are based, has the
property that the closed-world assumption augmentation of a consistent
database is in fact still consistent, and this is the foundation of the
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"negation as failure" implementation of the NOT operator in
PROLOG.
Default Logic
Reiter (1980) developed another approach to nonmonotonic
reasoning in which default statements are represented as rules of
inference of the following form:
a(x) : 6(x)
Y(*)
These are to be read as meaning that if a(x) holds, and 6(x) can
be consistently assumed, then infer Y(*)- The usual situation, in which
6 = Y (i.e., what must be consistent is simply the possible conclusion),
is referred to as a normal default rule. As in the case of the closed-
world assumption, this formalism is used to augment the initial set
of beliefs, in this case by applying the default rules to the initial database.
One interesting feature of this approach is that different augmentations
or extensions are possible given the same initial database and set of
default rules. For instance, given the following default rules and facts,
it is possible to conclude either that Nixon is a pacifist or that he is
not, depending on the order in which the default rules are applied:
Quaker(x) : Pacifist(x) Republican(x) : -i(Pacifist(x))
Pacifist(x) -,(Pacifist(x))
Quaker(nixon)
Republican(nixon)
These can be considered alternative belief states that a system could
arrive at based on the original knowledge state, but unfortunately, it
is difficult to do much reasoning about the processes that lead to these
alternate belief states because the default rules are themselves not objects
of the logic language per se and cannot be themselves the objects of
reasoning processes (the same problem referred to above regarding rules
in general).
Circumscription
One of the most influential approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning
is that of circumscription, introduced by McCarthy (1980, 1986). The
basic idea involves the development of a circumscription formula which
is another way of augmenting a database to include information that
has not been explicitly stated. The circumscription formula is designed
to add to the database only information which must be true with regard
to a particular predicate or set of predicates given the initial database.
That is, it is designed to add whatever is entailed by the minimal model
(state of the world) that is consistent with the initial database. The
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idea is used for default reasoning by introducing special "abnormality
predicates" that express exceptions to general rules and then
circumscribing them so that things are only believed to be abnormal
that of necessity must be abnormal given the initial database. For
instance, suppose we have a database containing the following:
(Vx) Thing(x) & -iABl(x) D -iFly(x)
(Vx) Bird(x) D Thing(x) & ABl(x)
(Vx) Bird(x) & -, AB2(x) D Fly(x)
(Vx) Ostrich(x) D Bird(x) & AB2(x)
AB1 expresses abnormalities that are possible to the general rule that
things don't fly, whereas AB2 expresses abnormalities that are possible
to the general rule that birds do fly. Note that all birds are AB1, although
they may not fly anyway, since some of them may be AB2 as well.
Circumscription, via a step through second order calculus (i.e., one
treating predicates as variables) derives the following new (first order)
rules which are not directly derivable from the original database within
first order logic.
(Vx) Thing(x) & -, Bird(x) D -i Fly(x)
(Vx) Bird(x) & -. Ostrich(x) D Fly(x)
Multiple and Default Inheritance
As the last two examples illustrate, a good deal of nonmonotonic
reasoning is concerned with issues which are very similar to the kinds
of inferences made in inheritance networks, and a good deal of work
in nonmonotonic reasoning is explicitly aimed at developing cleaner
semantics for issues such as multiple inheritance and inheritance with
exceptions (Etherington, 1987a, 1987b; Horty & Thomason, 1988;
Touretsky, 1986). These involve problems of inconsistency often
encountered when information about a concept can be inferred from
more than one superordinate concept in a knowledge base.
Reasoning from (Informal) World Models
Much of human reasoning seems to be based on (sometimes)
informal manipulations of various representations that we have or
construct about the world. The following sections introduce several
of the approaches taken along these lines. These approaches overlap
now, and will probably overlap more in the future. They involve (in
varying measure): (1) the use of similar previous situations to evaluate
new ones; (2) qualitative reasoning about space, time, and the ways
in which physical systems behave; and (3) the development and use
of (temporary) models of devices and situations.
Case-Based Reasoning
The case-based reasoning paradigm is largely based on the notion
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of episodic memory, as first developed in psychology by Tulving (1972)
and later developed in artificial intelligence by Schank and his students,
especially Kolodner (1984). This approach begins with the observation
that much of what is stored in human long-term memory consists of
particular events, including their characteristics such as what actions
were taken and what results occurred from these actions. Much of our
current problem-solving activities can be construed as using these past
examples as templates for our current actions, as opposed to abstract
reasoning based on the principles that have either been directly acquired,
as in school, or abstracted from experience (Kolodner, 1988; Rissland
& King, 1988). Some case-based reasoning approaches involve actively
analyzing the past experience to produce a new problem-solving
solution, whereas other approaches involve only showing that a previous
situation is similar enough to a current one that it ought to be considered
relevant to the current situation. The latter approach has largely been
limited to legal reasoning from precedents (Ashley 8c Rissland, 1988)
and appears to be of less general interest than is the former. However,
both ideas capture an important feature of human reasoning, and recent
efforts have been made toward integrating this approach with that of
reasoning from general knowledge (e.g., Rissland & Skalak, 1989).
Qualitative Reasoning
People clearly move about in physical space and make predictions
about the movements of other objects (e.g., trajectories of thrown objects
or the paths of accelerating self-propelled objects) that would require
tremendous computational resources if they were calculated in the full
details of the laws of physics, and they do so with remarkably little
effort or even conscious thought. Apparently they are utilizing a level
of description of knowledge of physics which is far more general and
computable (to say nothing of learnable) than is scientific physics. The
objective of the field of qualitative physics is to develop a theory of
this kind of knowledge in order to support common sense reasoning
about movements in the world and also to serve as a sort of preliminary
guide for the application of full scientific physics when that is
appropriate.
The key to this approach has been the attempt to develop low-
resolution abstractions of the real world that capture only those aspects
of the world which are relevant to the kind of reasoning that is being
performed (de Kleer & Brown, 1984; Forbus, 1984; Kuipers, 1984, 1986).
For instance, in many situations all that really needs to be represented
about a physical system can be captured in signs (positive, negative,
zero), that indicate which way a system is going, (e.g., the sink is filling
or emptying, or the ball is rising or falling), and a representation of
what sorts of boundary conditions will transfer a system from one sign
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to another. A more detailed but still qualitative level of description
is the use of inequalities (e.g., x will continue to be larger than y until
event e occurs).
Unfortunately, work in this area does not seem to be leading towards
a general representation and inferencing mechanism for time and space,
but rather seems to be focused on the representation of, and reasoning
about, particular physical systems. This does not appear to be a
temporary strategic emphasis, but rather reflects a general property of
the approach, which, much like model-based reasoning (see next section)
is based on segmenting reality into a series of zones within which
relatively simple representations hold and between which transitions
occur. This dependence on reasoning about particular devices or
situations provides a number of advantages such as a convenient
framework upon which to base the causal structure of events and the
constraint structure of the domain. But the lack of such decomposability
in general time/space movements severely limits the likelihood of general
success for the present approaches to naive physics as an approach to
unconstrained movement (i.e., for general kinematics). On the positive
side, such approaches have been developed for several complex industrial
systems such as turbojet engines, power plant condensers, mechanical
systems in a helicopter, and semiconductor fabrication (Cohn, 1989).
Not only are these important problems in themselves, they are good
examples of the sorts of domains in which it would be reasonable to
hope to be able to extract executable knowledge from text in the
foreseeable future. This work, like some of the work in the related area
of model-based reasoning, points to the sorts of domain-specific models
of reasoning that will be required for this kind of deep natural language
processing.
Model-Based Reasoning
A number of research efforts in artificial intelligence and cognitive
science have focused on how people use models of particular entities
in the world to reason in very specific ways about those entities. In
cognitive science, work has proceeded in two related directions, both
known as "mental models" research (Centner & Stevens, 1983). Johnson-
Laird ( 1983) has developed a theory about how people perform syllogistic
reasoning and similar abstract reasoning processes in which it is assumed
that they develop (often consciously) simplified, usually very concrete,
models that capture part of what the problem implies (e.g., a typical
situation of which the problem statement would be true). He has further
proposed that people read their conclusions from these models rather
than use a rule-based or logical approach, and he has found evidence
that people's errors correspond closely with those that would be predicted
by the use of these sorts of approximate models. In spirit, though not
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in detail, this approach is similar to that of naive physics, and might
even be called "naive logic."
A second approach to model-based reasoning in cognitive science
is very device specific. For instance, Norman (1983) has investigated
the mental models that people have of a variety of calculators and
explained their lack of optimal procedures for these calculators based
on their mental models. This sort of approach is seen also in much
work in the area of intelligent tutoring systems, in which there is often
an attempt to model a particular device that is being taught and the
student's knowledge of that device.
The major approach to model-based reasoning in artificial
intelligence attempts to base reasoning, particularly diagnostic
reasoning, directly on what is known about the physical device that
is modeled (Davis, 1984; Reiter, 1987). In other words, this approach
attempts to develop diagnostic "reasoning from first principles" as an
alternative to the traditional "compiled-knowledge" or rule-based
approach. The approach requires the ability to specify a well-defined
model of the device, including all the constraints that exist between
the well-defined components of the device. As a result, this approach
has so far been restricted to electronic, hydraulic, or similar devices
that have such well-defined internal structure and behavior. (Some
aspects of medicine are at the fringes of the feasibility of this approach. )
The diagnostic reasoning process begins by comparing the observed
behavior of the real device (e.g., the input and output readings of an
electronic device) with that predicted by the model. It then proceeds
to generate hypotheses which essentially consist of the lifting of
constraints regarding different parts of the model. In addition to
hypothesis generation, the process considers issues related to reducing
the search space of possible problems, and of discriminating between
alternative explanations.
In comparison to other approaches to diagnostic reasoning, model-
based reasoning is relatively device independent. That is, the new
information required to diagnose a new device is essentially a declarative
description of the device itself, rather than a detailed procedure that
relates to that device. As such, it is far more feasible to imagine the
direct extraction of text-based information into such a system than it
is in the case of rule-based systems. In essence, the device-specific
knowledge required for model-based reasoning is of the sort which is
more or less directly stated in textual documents, whereas the procedural
knowledge required in rule-based systems is usually unstated. Of course,
as presently developed, this form of case-based reasoning is somewhat
limited in the scope of applicability.
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Reasoning about Time and Action
Many of the reasoning tasks undertaken by artificial intelligence
involve the dimension of time and sequences of actions that occur over
time. These include obvious areas such as planning and prediction,
and also areas such as natural language understanding, explanation,
diagnosis, learning, problem solving, and spatial reasoning, all of which
deal with the temporal location of events. Unfortunately, at least from
the perspective of developing a general theory of temporal reasoning,
each of these areas (and others as well) has developed a different approach
to dealing with time, often by trying to deal with it as implicitly as
possible. For instance, a basic state space approach to problem solving
consisting of a set of possible world conditions (or "states") and a set
of permissible operators that change one possible state into another,
simply assumes that the order of operator applications (as reflected in
the shape of the search tree developed) indicates the temporal order
of the operators, and that that is all that is relevant regarding time.
This section deals with research areas that need to be relatively
explicit about time. These research directions began under the concept
of
"planning," which has long been considered one of the major general
topic areas in artificial intelligence. In recent years, planning has divided
into a number of related research topics.
Planning
Planning involves the selection of a series of actions designed to
achieve a goal. In a sense, this is nearly synonymous with all of cognition,
and is clearly an extremely complex reasoning process. General planning
involves knowledge about: temporal relations; physical space; causal
relations between actions and states; changes in physical and social
conditions; uncertainty regarding the nature of the outcomes of
particular actions (and even the ability to carry out particular actions
in the world); the beliefs, plans, goals, and intentions of agents; planning
knowledge (meta-knowledge); and strategies. It also involves the need
to obtain information dynamically and the ability to deal with conflicts
and interactions among goals.
As a result of this complexity, early work in planning, particularly
work attempting to develop formal approaches to the planning process,
was based on several severe simplifying assumptions regarding the nature
of the world.
The prototypical example of the finessing of the question of time
by using such simplifying assumptions is the situation calculus of
McCarthy and Hayes (1969) which was the basis of much of the classic
literature on planning (e.g., Fikes & Nilsson, 1971). This formalism
(which is very similar to the state space search approach to problem
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solving mentioned above) represents the world as a series of static states
and the instantaneous changes that can occur to transform one state
into another. The primary advantage of this approach is that it is simple.
The disadvantages are many and include the following:
1. No representation of gradual, ongoing, or delayed effects of actions.
2. No concurrent or overlapping actions.
3. No ways to deal with the various common-sense implications of
actions such as the default consequences of actions when things are
normal and the assumptions regarding what aspects of the world
have not changed.
4. No explicit representation of time per se at all. Moreover, this
approach to temporal change assumes that only one agent is causing
change, and that the knowledge of what occurs as a result of the
agent's actions is certain.
Even in this relatively trivial world, interesting issues were explored,
such as:
How to represent those aspects of the world that have not changed
after an action has taken place (the "Frame Problem").
How to monitor and repair actions that conflict or otherwise produce
an unsatisfactory plan.
How actions can be transformed by the knowledge of what conditions
need to hold after they take place.
How plans can be hierarchically produced by starting with the most
general considerations and/or those considerations which are least
alterable.
Moreover, some of these issues began to involve treating time in a more
explicit fashion. For instance, problem decomposition approaches to
problem solving and planning ran into the somewhat temporally
flavored problem of subgoal interaction, one form of which is having
the antecedents for an operation prematurely undone by another
operation. This led to devices such as "protection intervals" during
which the planner could not alter the conditions brought about by
operators.
In addition, this early work began to map out a space of possible
planning problems, according to such issues as whether the universe
is predictable in terms of the outcomes of actions and what other agents
exist and how predictable they are. As work progressed in planning,
it became clear, as in other major areas of artificial intelligence, that
there were too many issues to be dealt with simultaneously, and the
field separated into a number of (still overlapping) specialties, each
of which can be thought of as relaxing one or more of the original
simplifying assumptions of traditional planning.
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Temporal Reasoning
One of these specialties, temporal reasoning, is an attempt to clearly
represent time as an explicit and universal dimension of knowledge
representation (e.g., Allen, 1984; McDermott, 1982). This is not easy,
however, since there is no simple underlying scale to use. A literal time-
line, in some universal time, for instance, is not always feasible since
we often do not know the exact time of events. Relative temporal
information is also often problematic since it frequently leaves the
relative positions of nonadjacent events unspecified.
On a more technical level, the decision to represent time as an
explicit dimension leaves many representational issues open (Shoham,
1987). These include:
1. whether the basic units of time should be points or intervals, and
which of these units should be the elements over which assertions
should be asserted;
2. how the truth values of intervals constrain overlapping or contained
intervals (e.g., if we say that A is true from timel to time2, do we
really mean that it is true over all intervening intervals);
3. the mathematical structure of time (e.g., whether it is bounded and
whether it is a continuous scale); and
4. how exactly to formalize temporal expressions (e.g., whether time
is simply to be treated as additional arguments to standard predicates
or as a qualitatively distinct dimension on which atemporal
propositions are located and evaluated).
Moreover, the attempt to reason about temporally situated events leads
back to the issues introduced under nonmonotonic reasoning, in what
are even more complex forms. For instance, Shoham and McDermott
(1988) discuss what they call the qualification problem and the problem
of extended prediction. The former is the problem of permitting
defeasible inferences (those that might turn out to not be correct) without
reasoning about all of the qualifications that might limit their validity
(see the section on nonmonotonic reasoning), while the latter concerns
the length of time over which predictions of the future are valid, and
the potential need to decompose a scenario into an unmanageable
number of substeps in order to reason about the consequences of actions.
In effect, the latter point is that in reasoning under uncertainty, that
is, with less than complete knowledge, there is a trade-off between the
reliability of inferences, which is greater with small steps, and the
efficiency of reasoning, which is greater with large steps. Since there
is no way to avoid the need to reason with incomplete knowledge, this
seems to point to a very general dimension concerning intelligent system
design.
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Opportunistic Planning and Embedded or Reactive Systems
A third general area of research involves developing planning
systems that are capable of dealing with the opportunities and
contingencies presented by real-world events (as opposed to attempting
to formulate complete plans prior to execution, as in traditional planning
research). Research in this tradition tries to develop useful plan segments
that respond appropriately to situations presented by the world, and
is concerned with issues such as reasonable response times, planning
based on incomplete information, the need to develop plans to gather
new information, and the need to elaborate plans and to react to
unanticipated events during plan execution (Hayes-Roth 8c Hayes-Roth,
1979; Georgeff & Ingrand, 1989).
Multi-Agent Planning
A large number of difficult problems are introduced into the
planning process when one begins to deal explicitly with the interaction
of multiple agents, but these approaches also have the power to deal
with a variety of situations that go beyond those of traditional planning
systems. Among the issues that such approaches deal with are the need
to negotiate between competing agents (Sycara, 1988), and the
coordination of distributed cooperating agents (Durfee, 1988). A good
deal of this research (and of the related work on plan understanding)
focuses on the nature of goal relationships between agents, and much
of the work on multi-agent planning and goal relationships has focused
on architectures (especially the Blackboard architecture) designed to
support this sort of reasoning (Lesser et al., 1989).
LANGUAGE, COMMUNICATION, AND COOPERATION
Clearly, natural language understanding is the single area in
artificial intelligence that has the greatest potential for impact on library
science. It is just as important for other application areas within artificial
intelligence, since we are often concerned with manipulating the
products of human intelligence which are usually expressed in natural
language and with interacting with human users in natural language.
For instance, we are concerned in artificial intelligence with natural
language interfaces to database systems, to intelligent tutoring systems,
and to expert systems, and, as mentioned above, we would like to be
able to augment the knowledge acquisition process by extracting
knowledge directly from text.
However, natural language understanding is also in many ways
the broadest and most complex issue within artificial intelligence, as
evidenced by the fact that it is the only subarea within artificial
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intelligence that has a totally independent discipline that is concurrently
devoted to the problem. This discipline, computational linguistics, has
its own journal, annual meetings, workshops, etc., as well as departments
and departmental subsections. (The only other independent discipline
with such close ties to artificial intelligence is cognitive science, which
cuts across many, even most, of the interests of artificial intelligence,
including language understanding.) Two general issues, which are
critical for full natural language understanding, place language
understanding in the context of the sorts of issues that have been
discussed above. The first issue concerns the reliance of natural language
understanding on general world understanding, including the
understanding of other agents.
Language Understanding is Understanding
Definition 6
Intelligence is Culture, Communication, and Cooperation
One of the most important aspects of what is meant by intelligence
is the ability to communicate between, and coordinate among, agents.
Clearly, much of what we communicate about refers to various aspects
of the world physical properties, time, causality, movements, etc.
and the ability to interpret these sorts of communications depends exactly
on the ability to reason about these physical qualities of the world
(e.g., Talmy, 1988). On one level, language is simply a refined and
complex way of sharing our understanding of the physical world; on
another level, language clearly enables us to produce a deeper
understanding of the world than would otherwise be possible.
Plan-Based Understanding
The. most significant part of the world that people communicate
about is' that of other people, their plans and motivations, and full
understanding of linguistic communication requires the understanding
of why intelligent agents took the actions (both physical and linguistic)
that they did. This understanding depends on the comprehension of
how goals are accomplished in the world, how they interfere and interact
with each other, how beliefs and intentions generate goals, and how
goals are communicated and coordinated among agents (e.g., Charniak,
1988; Kass, 1989; Wilensky, 1983). (It also depends on some implicit
knowledge that human speakers share regarding how they will plan
speech acts in order to assist the hearer in deciphering their intended
meanings.) This understanding, in turn, is the basis for understanding
issues concerning how people interact in such situations as cooperative
problem solving, competition, negotiation, etc.
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Explanation
These issues can all be construed as examples of explanation-based
understanding. For instance, when a person says "Watch out,"
understanding the remark involves understanding, i.e., explaining to
oneself, the reason that the remark was made, whether it refers to a
physically threatening situation, the plans or motivations of another
person, or both. Thus the problem of explanation can be seen as a
common thread which runs through a number of issues in natural
language understanding, planning, and human computer interaction.
In the area of expert systems it is critical since, at a minimum,
a person must understand the reasoning process in order to be able
to accept (or reject) the machine's conclusions. This is particularly
important in light of the uncertain knowledge and data with which
expert systems deal, and the consequent heuristic nature of their
reasoning, and the very important consequences in many cases of the
recommendations that they make. However, the state of the art of
explanation facilities in expert systems has not caught up with the
theoretical work in explanation. Most of the current explanation systems
that are in widespread use are descendants of the original MYCIN
technique of using rule traces to answer how and why questions
(Shortliffe, 1976).
Although a rule trace is an interpretable structure, it is often not
the sort of thing that a person would provide another person to explain
his or her reasoning, and a good deal of work has been going on to
try to generalize and improve the rule trace approach. Some of this
work has approached the problem of trying to explain the strategic
level of a system's behavior by using explicit strategic problem-solving
knowledge (e.g., Hasling et al., 1984) while other work tries to improve
the rule trace by pruning it according to issues such as the importance
of steps (Wallis & Shortliffe, 1982) or the needs of particular users (Moore
8c Swartout, 1988). Ultimately, however, it is necessary to view the
generation of an explanation as a distinct cognitive act rather than as
a (possibly edited) readout of another cognitive act. Wick and Thompson
(1989) have taken such an approach to reconstructive explanation by
viewing it as a problem-solving activity in its own right. One important
aspect of the overall problem of explanation is nicely illustrated in
the case of interactive intelligent systems, in which a user can become
part of the problem-solving process. In these cases, in order for the
user to be able to realize the consequences of taking certain decisions
she or he must have available a wide range of qualitatively different
sorts of explanations.
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Context Recognition and Knowledge Retrieval
A second basic issue in general natural processing is how to bring
to bear the relevant sources of information necessary to interpret given
inputs. For instance, a sentence such as As the boy walked down the
aisle he took a can of tuna fish from the shelf and put it in his basket
seems to invoke a description (e.g., frame) of a supermarket in which
to understand the event. But the connections between the concepts of
this sentence and the concept of supermarket are all rather weak, and
on close consideration there would probably be dozens, if not hundreds,
of other concepts which would be just as likely to be invoked. The
problem is that such background information must be invoked it is
part of what we mean by understanding but there are too many
potentially related concepts to just generally invoke all related ideas.
This problem can be construed as the question of how to bring together,
in a coherent fashion, the explicit knowledge-based aspects of language
understanding and the looser sorts of reasoning which seem to be
involved in suggesting contexts and explanations. Suggestions along
these lines differ in how much they favor explicit knowledge-based
approaches and how much they favor loose probabilistic connections
(e.g., Charniak, 1988; Norvig, 1989).
LEARNING
Definition 7
Intelligence is the Ability to Learn
The Western intellectual tradition has a long history of turning
to learning as the key to all of intelligence. The British empiricist
philosophers of the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, as well
as the behavioral psychologists of the first half of the twentieth century,
essentially avoided any difficult questions regarding the nature of
knowledge and the processes that utilize knowledge by attempting to
uncover the mysteries of the processes by which that knowledge is
acquired. Today, most cognitive scientists agree that understanding the
products of learning is the key to unraveling the learning process itself.
Nevertheless, learning is a critical issue from a number of theoretical
and applied perspectives.
In addition to being an important theoretical issue in and of itself,
it is also important as a test of the other theoretical constructs that
are developed. All of the representational and inferential approaches
used by artificial intelligence should be able to stand the test of
learnability. In addition, learning is a critical theoretical component
of other cognitive facilities, most obviously that of language. Third,
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from an applied perspective, the overwhelming size of general world
knowledge upon which full natural language understanding and many
aspects of common-sense reasoning depend seems to demand learning
facilities since handcrafting the entire knowledge base appears to be
unfeasible. (An attempt to build a knowledge base containing all of
general "consensual" knowledge is the CYC Project [Lenat fe Guha,
1990]. It is not known whether this 200 person-year project will succeed;
in any case, its purpose is to build a large enough knowledge base
to support machine learning of specialized knowledge.) Fourth, learning
is critical to overcoming several other important problems in applied
artificial intelligence. For instance, in the general area of expert systems,
we are faced with the well-known knowledge acquisition bottleneck.
A good deal of effort is being put into developing software to aid in
knowledge acquisition, but that is not enough. We would also like to
employ learning procedures to help fine tune the knowledge base of
an expert system from its experience in the domain. Moreover, in the
case of systems that deal significantly with the knowledge systems and
goals of other agents (e.g., opponents, students, or interactive users),
we would like the system to be able to induce models of those agents
and hypotheses regarding their actions (e.g., reasons for the errors that
students make). As mentioned above, this sense of learning, that is,
the determination of a model for another agent's actions, turns out to
be critical for natural language understanding as well. Perhaps the most
ambitious long-term learning goal is that of developing systems capable
of acquiring significant amounts of knowledge from general
unconstrained text which, of course, would be a major advance on the
problem of knowledge acquisition.
The general learning problem is, however, extremely difficult. It
is never obvious what has to be learned (out of the general array of
information present), and it is often necessary to have a good deal of
background information in order to assimilate something new. In the
case of trying to learn about the consequences of actions there is the
particular problem of determining which, out of all of the actions which
took place, was responsible for the outcome that occurred (the credit
assignment problem).
In other words, learning, like the general problem of cognition
and many of the other subproblems within it such as planning, turns
out to be a multidimensional problem. There is no one learning problem
or learning scenario in cognition or artificial intelligence, and no single
learning algorithm or general approach to learning has proven capable
of handling all of the situations in which learning occurs. Learning
systems have approached the general problem by taking very specific
positions on a number of dimensions of the learning situation.
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These approaches can be categorized in several ways. For instance,
one can distinguish systems based on what they are designed to learn,
e.g., individual concepts, memory organization, or procedural
knowledge such as problem-solving ability or strategy. They can also
be classified in terms of the knowledge representation system used, e.g.,
predicate calculus, frames, semantic nets, memory organization packets,
production rules, or plans. Probably the most common classification
of learning programs involves the kind of learning situation they are
designed to deal with. These include rote learning, direct instruction,
learning from advice, and learning from examples. A number of factors
differentiate the learning environment further, as the following
questions illustrate:
Is there a teacher or just unmediated experience?
If there is an explicit or implicit teacher, is there a special order
to the examples that are chosen for presentation to the learner?
Do the examples include negative examples?
Does the training set include noise (i.e., examples which are incorrectly
labeled or classified)?
Can the learning system itself generate or request test cases?
What is the nature of the feedback regarding the presented examples
(yes/no vs. why vs. results of actions)?
Are the examples presented incrementally or simultaneously?
Most of the distinctions just described are most relevant to an
approach to machine learning that assumes that the basic problem is
that of inducing concepts from examples. By far the greatest amount
of research in machine learning has taken this example-based or
similarity-based approach to concept formation. These systems have
been based on several ways in which formal expressions can be
generalized: replacement of constants by variables, replacement of
constants by more general elements (e.g., from a type hierarchy), or
alterations of representation forms (e.g., eliminating links in a network
or predicates from an expression). Many useful ideas have come out
of this work, for instance, the classic work of Winston (1975) regarding
the usefulness of near-miss examples in clarifying concepts and the
version space search notion (Mitchell, 1977) which uses a candidate
elimination algorithm to efficiently converge on a candidate concept.
But many of the most promising ideas in machine learning have little
to do with the traditional similarity-based learning notion of the slow
empirical induction of concepts from large numbers of examples, and
are rather based on a number of interesting insights regarding situations
in which learning takes place.
Learning by Analogy. We clearly learn a great deal by assimilating new
experiences to old ones, and mapping what was true of the old onto
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the corresponding parts of the new (Centner, 1983; Greiner, 1988). Recent
work has explored how the processes of analogical understanding can
be employed in model-based reasoning (Falkenhainer et al., 1989).
Failure Driven Learning. One of the best opportunities to learn is when
predictions are not borne out. This leads to the question of "why"
and the consequent development of an explanation. The memory
organization system developed by Schank (1982), Kolodner, and others
(e.g., Kolodner, 1984) is based on the development of a generalization/
discrimination hierarchy of episodic knowledge where the differences
between events and their closest available generalizations provide the
indexing terms.
Active Discovery Learning. Much creative learning involves the
manipulation of known conceptual structures and the recognition of
when a resulting new "idea" is worth pursuing. Lenat (1982, 1983) has
developed systems capable of pursuing this sort of learning in areas
such as number theory. (These systems do not prove their conjectures.
Instead, they use heuristics to judge how interesting or promising they
are, and they continue to explore the new structures that are proposed
according to these judgments.) Recently, Kulkarni and Simon (1988)
have employed historical analysis of a specific scientific discovery (the
urea cycle in biochemistry by Hans Krebs in 1932) to derive and model
the set of heuristics that seem to have played a role in that process.
Learning by Problem Solving. Most kinds of problem-solving activity
result in new knowledge that is available if a similar problem is
encountered. The SOAR system (Laird et al., 1987) captures this
important observation. It is essentially an extension of the production
system architecture, with two major modifications. When more than
one rule instantiation is eligible, rather than resorting to a uniform
syntactic conflict resolution strategy, it treats the situation as a full
problem-solving situation. Secondly, it develops a new production rule
to capture the knowledge that results from this problem-solving activity.
This is probably the best example to date in artificial intelligence of
the integration of a very general learning strategy into a general cognitive
system (but see also Anderson, 1983). That is, SOAR is primarily a
general purpose cognitive architecture capable of simulating cognitive
activities as general as those that can be simulated by a production
system, but it is capable of dropping into the learning mode exactly
when the ongoing cognitive processes run into trouble. Moreover, it
also reflects human learning in the sense that it learns best when it
has a knowledge base that is closely related to the new information.
Explanation-Based Learning. In contrast to the slow, incremental
generalization of examples that is the hallmark of similarity-based
learning, explanation-based learning attempts to model the learning
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which occurs when a single event (e.g., the presentation of a novel
example of a concept) is compared to a rich, domain-specific pre-existing
body of knowledge that pertains to that event. This area overlaps with
several of the others, in that the explanation processes and the ways
in which background knowledge is used may be similar to analogy
learning, failure driven learning, or learning by problem solving. The
key point is that the system is actively trying to make sense of what
is presented to it, and learns directly through that comprehension process
(Dejong & Mooney, 1986; Krawchuk & Witten, 1989; Lewis, 1988).
A Note on Connectionism
A review of machine learning approaches would clearly be
incomplete without a discussion of connectionism, a new, nonsymbolic
computing method based on passing weights between the nodes in a
nonrepresentational network which is supposed to be roughly analogous
to the physiology of the brain (e.g., Schneider, 1987). A cautionary note
in this regard: This paradigm, which has been suggested as a complete
paradigm for all of cognitive activity, has no answers for several of
the demonstrably essential properties of cognition which were discussed
above in introducing the symbolic representation paradigm. In fact,
on close analysis, every program of this type amounts to no more than
a pattern-matching function between two finite sets. Pattern matching
is a difficult problem, and having self-learning approaches to this issue
is certainly very valuable, but it is certainly not all of cognition. In
terms of the analysis of learning situations just presented, connectionism
is essentially a new way of doing similarity-based learning. Not only
does it not deal with the more knowledge-based forms of learning, it
is, in certain regards, rather brittle when it comes to extending its
knowledge outside of the boundaries of the original learning situation,
even within a similarity-based approach.
Two other related caveats are worth mentioning here. The hallmark
of connectionism is that it is nonrepresentational, that is, nonsymbolic.
This has the appeal of seeming to avoid all of the hard work that
dealing with knowledge representation involves. But the lack of
interpretability means that in an ultimate sense a connectionist model
is not an explanation of whatever it does, even if it performs well,
since it cannot be explained, at least in terms of the level of analysis
in which we are interested. (That is, one can explain how individual
components are working, and how the overall system works as a system,
but one cannot talk, in general, in terms of the objects of the world
and objects of thought that constitute the universe of discourse regarding
cognition.) Systems without interpretable components present first, an
impossible software engineering task from the human engineering point
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of view, and second (aside from the human comprehension issue), a
fundamentally impossible system design task because the various
interactions between components of the system have no basis for
coherence. That is, assuming that all of cognition cannot be modeled
as one overall mapping from the set of inputs to the set of outputs
the arguments against this possibility are too numerous and
overwhelming to mention any attempt to simulate general cognition
in a connectionist framework must assume a large number of interacting
connectionist modules. (Even within very circumscribed problem areas,
connectionist models are constrained to sample densely from the set
of input possibilities and cannot generalize very far outside the realm
of that sampling.) For the outputs of one module to make sense in
the context of any of the other modules to which it might be sent,
it would appear necessary for it to have a meaningful interpretation
in the world. There appears to be no other basis for the internal coherence
of a system (Metzler, 1990).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Bringing It AH Back Together
The previous sections have outlined several of the important issues
and perspectives that are currently being pursued in artificial
intelligence. But, as mentioned above, there is something of a dialectic,
or rather several dialectics, in artificial intelligence between the fine-
grained perspectives and the more general. In a general sense, this is
just a dialectic between levels of granularity: fine-grained analysis vs.
coarser-grained synthesis. This general dialectic is also flavored by
related (but not equivalent) contrasts between issue-oriented vs.
architecture/system-oriented research and between theoretical vs.
applied research. This section will relate these issues to the state of
the art of artificial intelligence, and more particularly, to the state of
the art of expert systems.
Current Expert Systems
The current state of the art of expert systems (and this is generally
true of other artificial intelligence applications as well) is that they
are capable of carrying out very complex tasks, and doing so in ways
that roughly correspond to how people would carry out the task, but
only for tasks that are, in a sense, relatively homogeneous. That is,
there are no systems that are capable of dealing with even a large number
of the theoretical issues or dimensions described above, in a single
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 37
coherent, integrated way. And this is probably the greatest challenge
for the field today. While there are plausible models of many interesting
and important aspects of thinking, we do not have a plausible model
of how all of these aspects can be manifestations of a single theory
of knowledge representation and reasoning. And yet, even from an
applied point of view, it can easily be shown that any one of these
forms of reasoning can be important or necessary for certain tasks. Such
a unified theory of knowledge is critical if we are to achieve the long-
term goals of developing knowledge bases capable of supporting a variety
of tasks and of extracting significant parts of these knowledge bases
from natural language documents.
This section will ( 1 ) briefly point out a set of desirable characteristics
for expert systems, (2) provide an example of two systems in one domain
that illustrates the contrast between traditional homogeneous task-based
systems and those attempting to deal in more flexible ways with a variety
of knowledge-based tasks, and (3) illustrate how the development of
such flexible expert systems is dependent on progress on the theoretical
issues discussed above.
Design Requirements for Intelligent Interactive Systems
Metzler (1989) characterizes the present generation of expert systems
as "task-based" systems, which lack the flexibility necessary to utilize
a knowledge base for a variety of expert tasks or to interact in a number
of important ways with a user. A number of design requirements must
be met in order to develop expert systems that can support the flexible
human computer problem-solving interaction necessary to address more
typical real-world problems. Some of these requirements follow.
Ability to Address Multiple Problems
Most real problems of expertise involve a number of separate tasks.
For instance, design and diagnosis are frequently two sides of a single
domain of expertise, which might also include "redesign" or design
modification. Typically, the same person or persons would do all of
these tasks, and would do them all on a particular occasion for a
particular client. A system to perform these tasks or to aid a human
expert should ideally be capable of reasoning flexibly in any of these
modes and also capable of bringing these different modes to bear on
a single case. Note that this is a stronger requirement than the often-
expressed goal of expert system development: the ability to use a single
knowledge base as the foundation for a number of single task-oriented
expert systems, even if the tasks are not integrated into a single system.
Integration of Multiple Experts and Approaches
The current state of the art of expert system development involves
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not only very specific tasks, but also a single coherent approach toward
that task. There are at least two major aspects to this issue. The first
involves the point that human experts often take different approaches
to solving the same problem. In design, for instance, it is possible to
begin in a top-down way by looking at the overall situation, or in
a bottom-up way, by accumulating information about all the details
of a particular situation. It is extremely difficult to try to incorporate
widely different strategies in a single coherent problem-solving strategy,
but, in fact, this seems to be exactly what is needed to capture the
flexibility of even a single expert. Part of the inflexibility or lack of
common sense of current systems is probably attributable to this lack
of ability to take alternative approaches to a problem, and especially
to reason about why a particular approach would be a good idea in
a particular situation. Current expert systems lack the robustness
inherent in having a team of experts work on a problem together. In
fact, part of the current accepted practice in expert system development
is to avoid trying to accumulate system knowledge from more than
one human.
Multiple Relevant Dimensions
The second point regarding the integration of multiple approaches
involves the point that many real-world problems involve many
qualitatively distinct factors. For instance, design problems often involve
trade-offs on dimensions such as cost, reliability, various measures of
performance, ease of maintenance, ease of manufacture, etc. Strategic
decision making often involves trade-offs on dimensions such as costs,
potential gain, potential risk, etc. These trade-offs involve the ability
to compare qualitatively different sorts of considerations.
In the human case, teams of experts provide an additional problem-
solving advantage when each member can contribute specialized
expertise that would be difficult to find in a single person. In these
situations, it is not uncommon to have the experts working on individual
aspects or dimensions of a problem act as advocates for the importance
of the considerations they have been dealing with, and for the
recommendations to which their part of the whole problem has led
them.
Conflicting Information, Advice, and Requirements
One key to the development of systems capable of dealing with
multiple criteria within a problem space as well as the integration of
the advice of multiple knowledge sources, is dealing with the conflicting
conclusions that such knowledge sources will provide. The key to dealing
with these conflicts seems to be developing a richer knowledge base
that explicitly includes the reasons for and consequences of various
actions, so that potential actions can be reasoned about, not just invoked.
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Interactive Control
A user needs to be able to redirect the problem-solving activity
in a flexible manner, e.g., to return to previous points in the problem-
solving process, or to impose decisions or criteria.
Explanation
The key design requirement placed on the system by the need for
interactive, shared control is a full explanation facility that enables
the system to explain to the user why actions were taken, what the
alternatives were, and what the consequences of hypothetical actions
might be. These facilities and the data structures which they require
ought to be the basis also for communication among the semi-
independent problem-solving modules.
Learning
A true expert system ought to improve its performance as a result
of experience in the domain.
An Example: ELAND vs. ISLAND
The contrast between the general state of the art of expert systems
and the desired goal of the field is nicely illustrated in the comparison
of ELAND (Tanca & Ceri, 1986) and the AT8cT-supported research on
ISLAND (Metzler & Williams, 1988). Not all current systems are as simple
as ELAND, but the majority are. Moreover, even quite complicated
systems tend to be rather homogeneous in their reasoning processes.
Both of these systems are intended to aid in the process of local area
network design, but there the similarity ends. ELAND's task is to
recommend the general characteristics that a particular implementation
should employ, such as the type of network topology (ring, star, or
bus), based on the general characteristics of a particular situation. It
does not deal with the details of a particular situation, such as where
the nodes are physically situated, distances between them, physical
barriers to traverse, etc. ISLAND'S goal is to simulate the full range
of expertise that would be provided by a human expert in this field,
including diagnosis of problems, designing a network and modifying
a network, and it is intended to deal with the full reality of a particular
implementation, not just general characteristics of it. (ISLAND is still
under development, so while many of the design criteria have been
partially met, none have been fully satisfied.) Moreover, the design and
redesign problems address a large number of qualitatively separate issues
such as topology, software and hardware choices, costs, reliability,
performance, security, capacity, and extendibility. These issues do not
reduce to some single underlying dimension. There is no simple overall
"goodness heuristic" that permits all of these considerations to be thrown
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into a single search space. Rather, the issues must be dealt with explicitly,
and they must often be explained to the user/client who must make
an informed decision regarding the possible trade-offs. The design
problems are further complicated by the need to deal with constraints
such as using a particular vendor's products; using equipment that is
already in place; and using connections to other networks, mainframes,
databases, and special peripheral devices.
The ISLAND Architecture
This section briefly outlines the architecture that we have been
developing to provide the kinds of capabilities that were identified in
the previous section. It is intended to illustrate how different such an
architecture must be from that of a typical rule-based expert system.
The overall metaphor for the design of ISLAND is that of a cooperating
group of experts who are under the guidance of the user/client. The
notion of cooperation among expert modules and between the modules
and the user places a great emphasis on the problems of communication
and explanation. The basic components follow:
1. Experts and the Interface. The experts are semi-independent systems
that each embody the expertise relevant to a particular issue in local
area network (LAN) design, such as topology, medium selection,
budget, security, communications (i.e., bridges, gateways, and
protocol compatibility), client requirements, software and hardware
selection, servers, installation and maintenance, and traffic load. Each
expert reasons about its domain, posts the results of its reasoning
in terms that are meaningful for the other experts, and interprets
the relevant results of other experts. One special expert is the user
interface expert which translates the user's control instructions into
instructions that the system experts can carry out. This expert is
also responsible for gathering information from the user about a
particular design or diagnosis problem.
2. Knowledge Base and theLAN Design. The knowledge base is a frame/
inheritance-based representation of all the objects and concepts that
are relevant to this domain. At the more general levels are generic
concepts such as computer, storage device, protocol, etc., while at
the more specific levels, details of specific products are recorded. The
representations of concepts include constraints on how they may be
used (e.g., connected together) and information concerning various
aspects of their performance. The particular design that is being
developed or analyzed by the system is part of the knowledge base.
It is distinct in that all parts of the design are particular "instances"
of general concepts rather than concepts per se, and also in that
the system treats such structures as temporary data structures rather
than as part of the permanent knowledge base.
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3. Annotations and Dependency Pointers. The most difficult aspect of
this knowledge base involves structures to represent the abstract nature
of the planning process itself; in particular, the existence of conflicts
and the reasons for which design decisions were taken. These form
the basis for explanations to the user, and for explicit problem solving,
especially conflict resolution, by the system.
Our first approach to this issue involved adding a structure to each
piece of the LAN design structure that recorded the important reasons
for which it was created, i.e., which expert module made the decision,
when it was taken, what the relevant considerations were, what
alternatives were considered and rejected, and (when possible) why
the alternatives were rejected. The basic difficulty here is determining
what information is worth preserving, since it is impossible to record
everything. We are currently exploring a more dynamic approach
to recording this information which is essentially a variant on the
idea of a Truth Maintenance System (Doyle, 1979). In this approach,
pointers are set from each part of the LAN design to other parts
of the LAN design, including problem-solving abstractions such as
requirements and conflicts, to record why the LAN design component
was decided upon. The pointers are themselves annotated to record
the nature of the reason that they record. Question answering in
this mechanism requires the ability to trace the pointers that are
relevant to a particular type of question. Reasoning about conflicting
requirements can also take advantage of such pointer structures.
4. Control Requirements and Control Mechanisms. The requirement
for flexible interaction between system and user necessitates the ability
to redirect the system's current activity by resetting goals or priorities,
and the ability to return to past problem-solving states (while perhaps
retaining the current state for future reference). We are attempting
to capture this flexibility by basing the control architecture around
two data structures known as concerns and calls. The concerns are
user-oriented concepts that capture what a user is trying to do at
any particular point, while the calls are expert module-oriented, and
are specific tasks that the experts know how to carry out. The concerns
are decomposed into the more atomic calls by the interface module,
and the system maintains agendas of both concerns and calls for
the system to act on. An attempt is made to keep the calls and concerns
fairly specific so that the user is returned to at fairly tight problem-
solving intervals and is thus kept closely "in the loop."
5. Explanation Types and Mechanisms. The key to cooperative problem
solving between user and system and between the modules of a system
is the communication of appropriate information. We have been
developing mechanisms to communicate the following types of
explanations, which we have identified as critical to enabling the
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user to direct the system's problem-solving activities, to ensuring that
the user is taking responsibility for what the system is reasoning
about, and to making sure that users learn from the experience of
using an intelligent workbench such as ISLAND.
Domain Knowledge. Although this amounts essentially to querying
the knowledge base of concepts, there are difficult problems to be
addressed, such as comparisons between different objects and questions
regarding the scope of the system's knowledge.
System (Procedural) Knowledge. The first pass at explaining the system's
knowledge of actions to take involves reading out system rules in an
intelligible format. Some additional help in this regard can be obtained
from system knowledge of entities such as priorities. Higher level
explanations involve explaining the system's strategies. For now, we
are attempting to address this issue in terms of using, and reporting
to the user, system goals that are as explicit about the reasons for actions
as we can make them.
Reasons for Current and Past Actions. This is done as in a standard
production system by inspecting the way that the current or past
production rule matched the contents of working memory.
Reasons for Actions that are Not Taken. The reasons for which a current
possible action is not being taken by the system can be understood
by looking at rules that would take the action in question and seeing
why their conditions are not matched or why some other action is given
preference. The question of earlier possible actions that were not taken
is more difficult, but is in practice a very common situation. We are
exploring approaches to this problem based on the knowledge-base
partitioning method known as a context mechanism. This method
allows the system to incrementally generate environments in which the
results of all previous actions are visible but from which future actions
will remain hidden when they occur. At a future time, the system can
return from its current context (from which all intervening actions and
their results would be visible) to the earlier context which hides the
intervening actions and results, and look at a question as if the earlier
context were the present state of the system.
Hypothetical Situations. Questions regarding hypothetical actions can
similarly be addressed by creating temporary contexts and adding the
"what if" information to them.
Questions Concerning User System Interaction. Our general goal is to
make the system's actions as transparent to the user as possible in order
to support the most flexible possible interaction. Our general strategy
to try to achieve that goal is to design the system around objects such
as concerns, calls, and system actions that are as close as possible to
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how humans think about this problem domain. The test of using these
objects to serve as explanations is at once a critical way of determining
how cognitively motivated these objects are, and a way of providing
exactly what a user needs to drive such a system.
What Do We Need for the Next Generation of Expert Systems?
The ISLAND project illustrates the need for better fundamental
understanding of virtually all of the particular theoretical issues
discussed above. For instance, it is a horribly nonmonotonic problem.
Not only is it possible for a new fact to invalidate previously determined
information such as a previously determined design decision, but, in
fact, there are several concurrent qualitatively distinct lines of reasoning
taking place each of which, in general, can be expected to invalidate
parts of the reasoning processes already carried out by the others. The
objects of this domain call, in many cases, for complex knowledge
representation techniques, including examples of multiple inheritance
as when an object is both a computer and a fileserver. The domain
includes various aspects of temporal and spatial reasoning not currently
being explored, some of which might best be based on explicit reasoning
from cases or from models. The design process is very similar to that
of planning, particularly in regard to subgoal interaction, and clearly
requires "opportunistic" as well as retractable strategies. The need to
communicate with a user and between modules requires a form of plan-
based communication and understanding, and a form of distributed
cooperative problem solving. We would certainly like the system to
benefit from its experience, perhaps by storing case histories of partial
and complete plans, and perhaps even by storing planning histories
that capture examples of the reasoning process itself, rather than just
the products of the process. Such learning would clearly have some
of the qualities of explanation-based learning, and would ideally also
involve the ability to learn procedural information. Many or most of
the complex real-world problems that are most in need of artificial
intelligence applications quickly broaden out into this sort of open-
ended cognitive landscape. What keeps this problem from being totally
intractable is that the domain, as heterogeneous and complex as it is,
is still relatively well defined.
CONCLUSION
The State of Artificial Intelligence
The clearest implication of what has been said up to now is that,
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contrary to what some critics have claimed, artificial intelligence is
in a very healthy state as a science and discipline. It currently consists
of three overlapping general sorts of activities which mutually inform
and enrich each other. One consists of a very large body of practitioners
using a set of relatively well-understood tools that are capable of
successfully building remarkably complex systems that could not have
been built using conventional techniques (DEC, for example, tried three
times to build a VAX configuration program using conventional
programming approaches prior to initiating the Rl project with John
McDermott). They are also building thousands of economically
important smaller systems that would have been at least difficult to
conceptualize in conventional terms. The second group of activities
maintains elements of the pragmatic, domain-specific orientation while
explicitly seeking to advance the state of the art by undertaking projects
that require a deeper level of complexity and understanding than we
currently have. Finally, the third group is working on very specific
theoretical issues concerning the nature of computational reasoning
and representation. The important point is that the abstract issues are
all directly relevant to improving the capabilities of present applications,
and, at the same time, the complex applications contribute to
understanding the abstract issues by empirically investigating how these
abstractions need to be integrated in realistic examples of complex
thinking. The field is not a cacophony of disparate activities bearing
little relevance to each other. It is rather an attempt to examine
simultaneously at several different levels of granularity, the extremely
complex and heterogeneous activities of thought. The interplay between
these levels of analysis promises to continue to lead to important new
computational techniques, from logics and languages, through
representational and reasoning techniques, to macro architectures for
general reasoning and for reasoning in very complex domains. It
promises also to lead to far more precise and fine-grained understanding
of intelligence in general and human intelligence in particular. And
it promises to enable us to deal far more effectively with the procedures
and structures of intelligence as preservable, transferable, and executable
entities.
The Skeptical Viewpoint
There are those, of course, who dispute this view and feel that
the entire enterprise is ill-advised and doomed to failure. They are often
concerned that computation seems capable only of capturing the
prepositional (i.e., factual) content of human cognition, but not its
internal, experiential flavor. By this, they often mean the experience
of qualia, such as the experience of greenness per se, rather than facts
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about the color green, or other aspects of conscious experience such
as pain, emotions, etc. The next part of their argument usually is to
the effect that since intelligence clearly involves the interaction of an
organism/agent with the world, without this qualitative experience,
e.g., consciousness, no agent can really be embedded in the world, and
hence without consciousness nothing can be intelligent (i.e., even act
intelligently}. Of the several answers that are possible to these sorts
of objections, two seem particularly relevant. One is similar to the usual
point regarding digital representations: that they can approximate
reality to any degree desired, and, moreover, that in a digital
representation one can be certain regarding the size of error that is
permitted a point much more problematic in the case of representing
multiple qualitative dimensions rather than just a single numerical
value, but one that still seems to carry force. If we are concerned not
with the experience of qualia but with the implications they have for
the actions and inferences a system would take, there does not seem
to be any principled reason that representations could not be developed
for these entities, and procedures developed that lead a system to act
appropriately (e.g., a concept such as "fear" could have procedures that
determined which sorts of circumstances would produce it in varying
degrees, and also how it would influence the activities of the system.
In fact, Simon [1967] argued that any intelligent system approaching
the complexity of the human cognitive system would require such a
complex set of heterogeneous goals that the organized manipulation
and coordination of these goals would require something at least
analogous to human emotions).
Artificial Intelligence: The Medium is the Message
Artificial Intelligence as a Representational Medium
The second answer to the skeptics nicely sidesteps the issue of the
relationship between consciousness and intelligence, thereby promising
to reduce a great deal of largely futile debate (Hill, 1989). Hill suggests
that, in artificial intelligence, we are essentially developing a new
representational medium, which, like all media, has two facets. The
inner or technical facet is that which the creator is aware of during
the creation, as when a painter worries about the way that areas of
color are applied to a canvas. In this mode, we are all aware, for instance,
of the fact that motion pictures consist of a series of still photographs
that are shown in rapid succession on a screen, and, on another level,
that these still pictures are often created by means (e.g., cartoon drawings,
use of actors, use of special effects, etc.) which intentionally ensure
that the experience that they produce in the audience will be quite
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different from the actual reality that was involved in their creation.
The outer facet concerns the experience that the audience (including
the creator) shares through the medium, as when we suspend our
knowledge that the characters of a novel are fictitious, or that the world
in front of us is only light on a screen, and relive, as if it were real,
the world that is re-presented to us.
Artificial intelligence shares this dual nature. When one focuses
on the tools of the trade, the techniques and processes by which programs
are formed, it is easy to doubt that this is the fundamental stuff out
of which real intelligence, let alone consciousness, could be formed.
But when one steps back and watches a program performing what
appears to be an intelligent action, it is just as easy to suspend our
technical knowledge and participate in the experience of perceiving
an intelligent entity. (The fact that people are so easy to fool into
thinking that a program is behaving intelligently when, in fact, it may
be making use of relatively trivial programming devices is an important
one from the perspectives of human/machine interaction and program
evaluation, but it has absolutely nothing to do with the point at hand
although some critics of artificial intelligence seem to have made careers
out of this observation!) In short, with artificial intelligence we are
learning how to re-present to ourselves the very processes of intelligence,
so that we can store them, transmit them, and share them with others,
much as we do now with other representational media. As is the case
with other media, some of the products will be more useful than others.
Some will reflect more accurately what it means to be human than
will others. But if the products developed in this media are no more
real than the products developed in words, music, and visual images,
that should be real enough for even the most skeptical critics.
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